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 NOTE 
Probable Intent vs. Certainty: The Missouri 
Probate Court and the Uniform Probate 
Code 
In re Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d 445 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
STEPHANIE PIERCE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Intestate succession statutes are difficult to design – they must be defi-
nite enough to ensure judicial efficiency, yet also match the average dece-
dent’s probable intent.1  With the ever-changing family dynamic, it is difficult 
for these statutes to keep up, and it is likely impossible for them to stay 
ahead. 
This Note seeks to address how increasingly complex family situations 
should impact intestacy statutes.  In In re Brockmire, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri specifically addressed what occurs when a decedent predeceases his 
biological granddaughter and his biological daughter, who had been adopted 
as an adult by her stepfather.2  Unfortunately, the court, bound by statute, was 
unable to even contemplate a remedy consistent with the probable intent of 
the decedent.3 
In addressing this complex set of family circumstances, this Note will 
first take an in-depth look into Missouri intestacy law.  Additionally, this 
Note will address and analyze the different approaches of other states, as well 
as the approach taken by the Uniform Probate Code, and will compare each 
of those methods to the applicable Missouri statutes.  This Note argues that 
the current Missouri intestacy statutes are antiquated and need to be reformed 
to match the standards set forth by the Uniform Probate Code. 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2010; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2016.  Associate Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016.  Special 
thank you to Professor David English for his insight, knowledge, and feedback.  Sin-
cere appreciation to the Missouri Archives Department for all of its assistance and 
parience. 
 1. Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of 
Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1034 & n.12 (2004). 
 2. 424 S.W.3d 445, 446 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 3. Id. at 450. 
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II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Lonnie Brockmire (“Decedent”) died intestate4 on July 18, 2011.5  De-
cedent was not survived by a spouse or a parent.  Decedent was, however, 
survived by his brother, Ronald, his biological daughter, Sherri, and Sherri’s 
biological daughter, Decedent’s granddaughter, Bella.6  Sherri brought this 
suit on behalf of Bella in hopes of receiving a portion of Decedent’s estate.7  
The Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County granted 
partial distribution of Decedent’s estate to Bella, a decision Ronald success-
fully appealed.8 
Ronald’s appeal was based on his contention that Bella was not a legal 
heir of Decedent.9  Ronald argued that because Sherri’s stepfather had adopt-
ed Sherri prior to Decedent’s death, the legal relationship between Decedent 
and Sherri had severed.10 
Ronald’s argument was based on two Missouri probate statutes.11  
Ronald first cited Missouri Revised Statutes Section 474.010(2), which pro-
vides that a decedent’s intestate estate will be distributed to the decedent’s 
descendants only if the decedent’s child predeceases12 his descendants.13  
Ronald stated that even if Bella’s legal relationship with Decedent had not 
dissolved, Bella would have only been able to inherit from Decedent if Sherri 
had predeceased Bella.14  Additionally, Ronald cited to Missouri Revised 
Statutes Section 474.060(1), which states that adoptees may only inherit from 
their adoptive parents.15  Ronald contended, and the court confirmed, that 
 
 4. Defined as: “Of, relating to, or involving a person who has died without a 
valid will.”  Intestate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 5. Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d at 446. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 445. 
 8. Brief of Appellant Ronald W. Brockmire at 1, Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d 445 
(No. ED 99103), 2013 WL 210165. 
 9. Id. at 4. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. §§ 474.010, .060 (2000). 
 12. Defined as: “To die before (another).”  Predecease, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 13. Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d at 446 (emphasis added) (citing § 474.010) (“The 
part not distributable to the surviving spouse, or the entire intestate property, if there 
is no surviving spouse, shall descend and be distributed as follows: (a) To the dece-
dent’s children, or their descendants, in equal parts; (b) If there are no children, or 
their descendants, then to the decedent’s father, mother, brothers and sisters or their 
descendants in equal parts . . . .”). 
 14. Brief of Appellant Ronald W. Brockmire, supra note 8, at 6. 
 15. Id. at 7 (citing § 474.060(1)).  Additionally, Ronald argues that the purpose 
of Section 474.060 would be frustrated if Bella was allowed to inherit because she 
would stand to inherit from both her biological and adopted grandfathers.  Brief of 
Appellant Ronald W. Brockmire, supra note 8, at 7; Respondent’s Brief at 8–9, 
Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d 445 (No. ED 99103), 2013 WL 802893. 
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once Sherri was adopted, Bella “lost her status as a descendant of [Dece-
dent’s] child.”16  This meant that neither Sherri nor Bella could receive any 
portion of Decedent’s estate.17 
Sherri countered with several arguments to persuade the court that the 
Probate Division’s distribution of Decedent’s estate was proper.18  Sherri first 
stated that the terms contained in Sections 474.010(1) and (2) were in con-
flict.19  The term “issue” is used within the statute to limit the portion of the 
intestate estate distributed to a spouse and, subsequently, the phrase “children 
or their descendants” is used when discussing distribution of a decedent’s 
property when there is no surviving spouse.20  Sherri argued that this created 
a conflict because an “issue,” which encompasses a larger group of individu-
als, was able to inherit when there was a surviving spouse, but only “children 
or their descendants” could inherit when there was no surviving spouse.21  
Because the term “issue” is broader than “children or their descendants” by 
definition, Sherri stated that Bella would have been able to inherit if “issue” 
had been used in Section 474.010(2) in lieu of “children or their descend-
ants.”22  Sherri additionally argued the legislature’s intent when invoking the 
phrase “children or their descendants” must have been to clarify that the first 
generation is required to inherit before any subsequent generations.23 
Sherri also contended that Section 474.060 should not impact Bella.24  
Sherri noted that the statute referenced the elimination of a legal relationship 
between an adoptee and her biological parents, but made no mention of an 
adoption’s effect upon an adopted person’s pre-existing children.25  Sherri 
further noted that had it been the legislature’s intent to eliminate the grand-
parent and grandchild’s legal relationship, they easily could have done so.26 
Beyond statutory construction, Sherri argued that the court must look 
beyond the wording of intestacy statutes when determining the legislature’s 
intent.27  Citing to Missouri adoption statutes, Sherri argued that the removal 
of Bella as a legal heir of Decedent frustrated the purposes of Missouri law.28  
Sherri cited Missouri Revised Statutes Section 452.402 in support of her 
proposition, which permits grandparents to be awarded visitation time to 
 
 16. Brief of Appellant Ronald W. Brockmire, supra note 8 at 7; Brockmire, 424 
S.W.3d at 447–48. 
 17. Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d at 450. 
 18. See generally Respondent’s Brief, supra note 15. 
 19. Id. at 2–4. 
 20. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 474.010(1)–(2) (2000). 
 21. In re Brockmire, No. 99103, 2013 WL 2484534, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. June 
11, 2013); see MO. REV. STAT. § 472.010 (2000). 
 22. Brockmire, 2013 WL 2484534, at *3. 
 23. Id. at *5. 
 24. Id. at *2–3. 
 25. Id. at *5. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 15, at 7. 
3
Pierce: Probable Intent vs. Certainty
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
836 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
grandchildren; in the case of an adopted grandchild, a grandparent’s visitation 
rights are not automatically or explicitly terminated upon adoption.29 
Additionally, Sherri tried to combat Ronald’s contention that Section 
474.010 forbade Bella from receiving a distribution of Decedent’s intestate 
estate, regardless of adoption, because Sherri had not predeceased Dece-
dent.30  Sherri attempted to persuade the court to treat her as though she had 
pre-deceased Decedent under the statute and find that Bella must be treated as 
an heir because the adoption did not eliminate Bella from Decedent’s “bio-
logical line.”31 
Lastly, if the Probate Division’s ruling was overturned, Sherri argued, it 
would violate Bella’s due process rights.32  Without citing any case law, 
Sherri concluded that all individuals have a vested right in their legal blood-
line at birth.33  Sherri stated that her adoption wrongly deprived Bella of her 
“vested right of a relation to . . . Decedent as a descendant of the child.”34 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District heard Ronald’s 
appeal of the Probate Division’s decision.35  The court of appeals first looked 
to Section 474.060’s definition of “child” for the purposes of intestate succes-
sion.36  The statute declares that an adopted person ceases to be the legal child 
of the biological parent upon adoption;37 meaning, once Sherri’s stepfather 
adopted her, she was no longer Decedent’s legal child or heir.38  Because 
Sherri is not Decedent’s legal child under the intestacy statute, Bella was 
likewise not the legal grandchild of Decedent.39 
The court of appeals did not give credence to Sherri’s argument that 
Missouri’s intestacy statute was in conflict with itself.40  Without providing a 
contrary interpretation, the court of appeals stated that Bella was not a lawful 
heir of Decedent, which made any conflict in the statute irrelevant.41  The 
court of appeals also looked to Missouri adoption statutes, which take the 
 
 29. Id. at 8 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 452.402(6) (Cum. Supp. 2013)) (“[T]he 
right of a grandparent to maintain visitation rights pursuant to this section may termi-
nate upon the adoption of the child.”).  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern 
District, however, stated “Section 452.402 does not . . . give rights of visitation to 
grandparents unless visitation is found to be in the child’s best interest.”  Aegerter v. 
Thompson, 610 S.W.2d 308, 309–10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 30. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 15, at 7. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 12. 
 33. Id. at 13. 
 34. Id. 
 35. In re Brockmire, No. ED 99103, 2013 WL 2484534, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 
June 11, 2013). 
 36. Id. at *2. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at *3. 
 40. Id. at *4. 
 41. Id. 
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“substitution approach,” meaning an adopted child “becomes the child of its 
adopting parents for every purpose . . . .”42  Additionally, the court of appeals 
dismissed Sherri’s argument that an outcome adverse to Bella would thwart 
the legislature’s intent.43  The court of appeals stated that it “need not look at 
the ‘general purpose of intestacy statutes’” as Sherri requested because the 
plain language of both the intestacy and adoption statutes demonstrated that 
Bella was not a legal heir of Decedent.44 
Lastly, the court of appeals rejected Sherri’s argument that Bella’s due 
process rights had been violated.45  The court of appeals stated that this ar-
gument had no merit or support.46  Further, there can be no “vested legal 
right” in a bloodline for the purposes of intestate succession, as Missouri stat-
utes state that a bloodline can be substituted for legal purposes.47  The court 
of appeals concluded by holding that, for the above reasons, the Probate Divi-
sion’s determination was unsupported and made Ronald the sole legal heir of 
Decedent’s estate.48 
Coming to the same ultimate conclusion as the court of appeals, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri held that Ronald was the sole legal heir of Decedent 
because distribution of Decedent’s intestate estate must be based on statutory 
construction alone.49  The court similarly found no merit behind Sherri’s ar-
gument that Bella “had a vested legal right to her bloodline.”50  The court 
enunciated that because expectant heirs have no vested interest until death, 
Bella had no right to lose.51  The court stated that, under Missouri’s intestate 
statutes, once a descendant is adopted, the legal relationship between the de-
scendant and her biological parent is destroyed – even when the descendant 
was adopted by their stepparent.52  Subsequently, the severance of the legal 
relationship between a biological father and daughter destroys the legal rela-
tionship between the biological father and any of the daughter’s children or 
her descendants.  The Supreme Court of Missouri stated that under Missouri 
probate law, adoption severs all legal ties between the parent and biological 
child, eliminating all intestate succession rights.53 
 
 42. Id. (alteration in original).  Missouri adoption statutes contemplate both the 
adoption of adults and minors.  See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 76 S.W.2d 685, 
686 (Mo. 1934). 
 43. Brockmire, 2013 WL 2484534, at *5. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at *6. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. In re Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d 445, 446 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 50. Id. at 449. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 450. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part will first look at the history of adoption in Missouri and ad-
dress many important changes within both Missouri adoption and Missouri 
probate statutes that have occurred over the past century.  Additionally, this 
Part will analyze the trend of acceptance, and even endorsement, of adoption 
in Missouri, and in particular how the adoption statutes have evolved to be-
come more favorable toward adopted children and adoptive parents alike. 
This Part will also look at the Uniform Probate Code’s (“UPC”) treat-
ment of the effect of adoption on inheritance and the recent changes to it.  
Lastly, this Part will look at the Missouri statutes that currently dictate parent-
child relationships for intestacy purposes and similar statutes enacted by other 
states, specifically analyzing the 1980 amendments to the Missouri Revised 
Statutes. 
A.  Missouri Adoption History 
The history of adoption in Missouri has undertaken an extensive evolu-
tion throughout the last century, moving from a more or less contractual sys-
tem to one involving much deeper considerations.  This evolution has created 
many complex matters, including inheritance issues, which comprise the in-
testacy rules.  This Part seeks to provide a narrative to this evolution as well 
as an analysis of resulting approaches. 
1.  Origins 
The laws surrounding intestate succession of adopted children have 
evolved for over a century, becoming much more favorable to adoptees.  The 
first Missouri adoption statute was enacted in 1857.54  Its enactment gave 
adopted children very basic human rights, such as “support and maintenance” 
and “proper and humane treatment.”55  However, other protections were 
 
 54. Goldberg v. Robertson, 615 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).  The 1857 
statute stated in part: 
 
[f]rom the time of filing the deed with the recorder, the child or children 
adopted shall have the same right against the person or persons executing the 
same, for support and maintenance and for proper and humane treatment, as a 
child has, by law, against lawful parents; and such adopted child shall have, in 
all respects, and enjoy such rights and privileges as against the person execut-
ing the deed of adoption.  This provision shall not extend to other parties, but 
is wholly confined to parties executing the deed of adoption. 
 
1857 Mo. Laws 59, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 55. Clifford S. Brown & Thomas E. Toney, Comment, Eligibility of Adopted 
Children to Take by Intestate Descent and under Class Gifts in Missouri, 34 MO. L. 
REV. 69, 69–70 n.7 (1969). 
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granted by the courts, such as forbidding an adoptive parent from inheriting 
through their adoptive children.56  This determination may reflect the fear of 
predatory adoption in Missouri during that time, or perhaps a lack of legisla-
tive foresight.57  A 1878 case, Reinders v. Koppelmann, illustrates those pro-
tections.  In Reinders, an adopted child predeceased her adoptive mother.58  
The Supreme Court of Missouri made it clear that the adoptive mother of a 
child who dies intestate cannot inherit from her adoptive child.59 
Although the century-old laws provided minimal protections to adopted 
children, they were still very far from what today’s statutes provide.60  Even 
though adopted children could inherit from their adoptive parents, inheriting 
through them was an entirely different story.61  The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, in Hockaday v. Lynn, a 1906 case regarding the distribution of a dece-
dent’s estate, demonstrates this point.62  In Hockaday, a child was not permit-
ted to inherit from her adoptive mother’s brother.63  The Hockaday court de-
clared that the child would not be permitted to inherit through her father, as 
the adopted child was “an alien to his blood.”64 
 
 56. See id. at 71. 
 57. See id. (“Although . . . the courts were willing to allow the adopting parent to 
create an heir for himself, they refused to allow the adopting parent to make himself 
an heir, partly because the 1857 Act was unclear on this point, and partly because of a 
desire to prevent possible predatory adoption.”). 
 58. Reinders v. Koppelmann, 68 Mo. 482, 483 (1878). 
 59. Id.  The court in Koppelman stated that this view is not in line with their 
sense of justice, but the court is bound by statute, citing the Statute of Descents 
which: 
 
provides, that “when any person having title to any real estate . . . of inher-
itance shall die intestate as to such estate, it shall descend . . . if there be no 
children, or their descendants, of the person so dying intestate to his or her fa-
ther, mother, brothers or sisters.”  It does not say adopted father or mother.  
Again: the Statute of Descents makes no distinction as to how the person so 
deceased acquired the property.  If he or she have an estate of inheritance – no 
matter how acquired – and die intestate, such estate shall pass to the persons 
named above. 
 
Id. at 485 (emphasis added). 
 60. See MO. REV. STAT. § 453 (2000). 
 61. Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S.W. 585, 589 (Mo. 1906). 
 62. See id. at 585. 
 63. Id. at 589. 
 64. Id. at 588.  This doctrine has also been titled as the “stranger to adoption” 
rule.  Joanna L. Grossman, The Potential Consequence of Adult Adoption for Inher-
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In 1917, the statutory rules of inheritance for adopted children pro-
gressed from what Missouri law had previously permitted.65  Adopted chil-
dren were now able to inherit through their adoptive parents, and adoptive 
parents were now able to inherit through their children.66  In St. Louis Union 
Trust Co. v. Hill, the Supreme Court of Missouri referenced this alteration as 
a “change [in] the blood stream of an adopted child,” and acknowledged that 
adopted children were the children of adoptive parents “for every purpose as 
fully as though born to the adopting parents.”67  In Hill, the adoptees at issue 
were two adult stepchildren of the decedent, who the decedent adopted short-
ly before his death.68  One caveat to this rule was given: inheritance rights 
were dictated by the statute in place at the time of the adoption.69 
The amendment to the 1917 statute in 1947, however, demonstrated the 
legislature’s evolving view of adoption.  This amendment eliminated the rule 
of law that dictated that an adopted child’s intestate succession rights corre-
spond with the law at the time the adoption took place.70  But a new question 
arose – whether an adopted child could still inherit from his natural parents – 
a question that St. Louis Trust Co. v. Kaltenbach answered in the affirma-
tive.71  The Kaltenbach court stated that the statute permitting adopted chil-
dren to inherit from their parents did not preclude that child from also inherit-
ing from their natural parents.72  Another Supreme Court of Missouri holding 
 
 65. See Brown & Toney, supra note 55, at 72 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 1101 
(1919)) (“When a child is adopted in accordance with the provisions of this article, all 
legal relationship, and all rights and duties, between such a child and its natural par-
ents shall cease and determine.  Said child shall there after be deemed and held to be 
for every purpose, the child of its parent or parents by adoption, as fully as though 
born to them in lawful wedlock.  Said child . . . shall be capable of inheriting from, as 
the child of said parents as fully as though born to them in lawful wedlock.”). 
 66. Id.  Brown and Toney interestingly stated that this Missouri advancement 
was not “innovative” as Massachusetts had enacted such legislation in 1851.  Id. at 72 
n.24. 
 67. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Hill, 76 S.W.2d 685, 689 (Mo. 1934). 
 68. Id. at 686. 
 69. Fred L. Kuhlman, Intestate Succession by and From the Adopted Child, 28 
WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 244 (1943) (citing McIntyre v. Hardesty, 149 S.W.2d 334, 338 
(Mo. 1941)) (“That Act, it seems to us, was intended to apply altogether prospectively 
and to persons adopted according to the provisions and requirements of the Act.”). 
 70. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.150 (1943).  The amendment stated: 
 
Any person adopted by deed of adoption or agreement of adoption in writing 
prior to 1917 and wherein said instrument was filed for record prior to July 1, 
1917, shall hereafter be deemed and held to be for every purpose the child of 
its parent or parents by adoption as fully as though born to them in lawful 
wedlock, and such adoption shall have the same force and effect as an adop-
tion under the provisions of this chapter, including all inheritance rights. 
 
Id. 
 71. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kaltenbach, 186 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Mo. 1945). 
 72. Id. 
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agreed with Kaltenbach, declaring that “the legislature has not said that one 
who has been adopted by another shall not inherit from his natural parents.”73  
This view has shifted through both case law and statute in Missouri.74 
2.  Shifting Views & Intestate Succession Statutes 
Eight years after Kaltenbach, the Supreme Court of Missouri changed 
its view of the statutory interpretation of the 1917 adoption statute.75  In 
Wailes, the court held that the Missouri statutes expressly precluded adopted 
children from inheriting through their natural parents; likewise, natural par-
ents were precluded from inheriting from their children who have been 
adopted.76  Emphasizing this point, the court stated: 
The legislature in providing that all rights between the natural parent 
and the child should on adoption “cease and determine” did not intend 
to nor does it mistreat that class of children. After all, perhaps the leg-
islature thought it best and intended to effect just what the statute says, 
that all rights, including the right to inherit, shall “cease and deter-
mine.”77 
More recently, a Missouri appellate court enforced this point of view.78  
In In re Tapp’s Estate, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that John Oliver, 
the natural child of Ralph Tapp, was unable to inherit from his biological 
father because he had previously been adopted.79  The court also noted the 
potential public policy concern of a double inheritance, as John Oliver had 
previously inherited from his adoptive father, although it is unclear what, if 
any, difference that made in the court’s conclusion.80 
B.  Goals of Intestate Succession Statutes 
Statutes stipulating the distribution of intestate estates are complex, and 
there are multiple factors that drafters must take into consideration.  Because 
of the multitude of factors, drafters have taken many different approaches in 
an attempt to attain the decedent’s probable intent while maintaining judicial 
efficiency.81  This complexity is in part caused by the fact that the American 
 
 73. Miss. Valley Trust Co. v. Palms, 229 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Mo. 1950). 
 74. See MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060 (2000). 
 75. Wailes v. Curators of Cent. Coll., 254 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Mo. 1953) (en 
banc). 
 76. Id.; see also § 474.060(1). 
 77. Wailes, 254 S.W.2d at 649. 
 78. In re Tapp’s Estate, 569 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1978). 
 79. Id. at 285. 
 80. See id. at 285–86. 
 81. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1034. 
9
Pierce: Probable Intent vs. Certainty
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
842 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
family has evolved rapidly in recent years, while the traditional nuclear fami-
ly is becoming less common.82 
Striving to meet many evolving factors, Section 1-102(b) of the UPC83 
lists the purposes of the Code.84  Those purposes include: simplicity, clarity, 
and making “effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property 
[and] to promote a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of 
the decedent . . . .”85  Here, the common theme is the promotion of the dece-
dent’s intent, coupled with efficiency.86  As phrased by Ralph Brashier, an 
expert in probate law, “[T]he first goal of intestacy law is to effectuate the 
typical decedent’s intent, but like all laws, probate laws ultimately should 
promote and protect the state.”87 
Applying these goals to the abundance of family combinations can be 
arduous, especially when coupled with the objectives of adoption.  One goal 
of adoption is to “strengthen[] the new family unit [between the adopted child 
and adoptive parents],” which is met, in part, by severing ties with the biolog-
ical parents.88  But this goal may not be desirable in most adoptions, as over 
half of adoptions “involve children adopted by stepparents or relatives, where 
the adoption may be completed for legal rather than relationship purposes.”89 
Adoption of stepchildren presents interesting complications as compared 
to an adoption by two non-biological parents because, “[I]n [that] situation, 
continued association between the child and the genetic parents is more likely 
to occur.”90  Perhaps the conflict between meeting the goals of traditional 
adoption and stepparent adoption explains why states have taken different 
approaches on a child’s ability to inherit through either biological parent 
when adopted by a stepparent.91  Eleven states currently permit children to 
maintain the ability to inherit from either biological parent after being adopt-
 
 82. Natalie Angier, The Changing American Family, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/health/families.html?pagewanted =all&_r=0 
(“This churning, this turnover in our intimate partnerships is creating complex fami-
lies on a scale we have not seen before.”). 
 83. The Uniform Probate Code was drafted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and was approved and recommended for 
enactment in all states by the Commissioners.  See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE 
(amended 2010). 
 84. Id. at § 1-102(b). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1035 n.12 (quoting RALPH C. BRASHIER, 
INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 7 (Temple Univ. Press 2004)). 
 88. WILLIAM MCGOVERN JR., SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID ENGLISH, PRINCIPLES 
OF WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 115 (Thompson Reuters ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Intestate Inheritance Rights for Adopted Persons, CHILD WELFARE INFO. 
GATEWAY 2 (2012), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/inherita-nce.pdf. 
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ed by a stepparent.92  Fourteen states allow children to inherit from or through 
either biological parent after adoption by a stepparent, depending on whether 
the adoption took place after the death of a biological parent.93  Lastly, twen-
ty-two states, including Missouri, provide for a full substitution approach.94 
C.  Approaches 
In Missouri, “The law of inheritance is a creature of statute.”95  Addi-
tionally, “The status of adopted children under the statutes of descent and 
distribution will not vary.”96  The Missouri statute takes a hard stance as 
compared to the UPC and other jurisdictions,97 specifically declaring that 
adopted children may not inherit through their natural parents.98  Section 
474.060 proclaims, “[F]or purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of 
parent and child must be established to determine succession by, through, or 
from a person, an adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of 
the natural parents.”99 
Missouri, however, did not always take the full substitution approach.100  
In 1980, Missouri enacted significant changes to its Probate Code, many of 
which were modeled after the UPC.101  Prior to 1980, Section 474.060 only 
provided for the impact of intestate succession upon illegitimate children.102  
In 1980, Senate Bill No. 637 altered Section 474.060 to include adopted chil-
dren and permitted adopted children to inherit from either biological parent 
when the adopting parent was “a spouse of a natural parent.”103  The 1980 
 
 92. Id. (Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Maine, Michigan, Montana, 
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia permit inheritance from either birth par-
ent when adopted by a stepparent). 
 93. Id. (Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Wisconsin). 
 94. Id. at 5–38 (including: Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Car-
olina, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming).  The three remaining states – Illinois, 
Pennsylvania and Texas – provide a varying set of standards.  Id. at 15, 30, 33. 
 95. Robertson v. Cornett, 225 S.W2d 780, 785 (Mo. 1949). 
 96. 5 MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES, PROBATE LAW & PRACTICE § 359 (3d ed.). 
 97. See, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2108 (1976); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060 
(2000). 
 98. See § 474.060.1.  However, “adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural 
parent has no effect on the relationship between the child and such natural parent.”  
Id. 
 99. Id. (emphasis added). 
 100. 1980 Mo. Laws 480. 
 101. 1980 Legislation Affecting Trusts and Estates, 16 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
48, 74–75 (1981). 
 102. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060 (1955) (amended 1981). 
 103. 1980 Mo. Laws 480. 
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statute, therefore, produced the same result for children adopted by steppar-
ents as Section 2-119 of the UPC.104 
In 1981, Missouri again altered its stance through the enactment of Sen-
ate Bill No. 117.105  The purpose of Senate Bill No. 117 was to “[a]mend 
various provisions of the Probate Code of Missouri that were affected by the 
major revision[s] [of the] 1980 legislation.”106  Section 474.060 was revised 
to state, “[A]doption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect 
on the relationship between the child and such natural parent.”107  This statute 
remains in effect today.108  Although the exact reason for this alteration re-
mains unclear, the Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal of 1982 stated 
that the amendment to Section 474.060 was “to make clear that adoption by a 
spouse of a natural parent does not affect the relationship between the child 
and the spouse who is the natural parent, but such rule does not apply to the 
other natural parent.”109 
Unlike Missouri statutes, the UPC takes the likelihood of a continued re-
lationship between a biological parent and their child who was adopted into 
consideration for determining distribution of the biological parent’s estate.110  
Specifically providing for this instance, UPC Section 2-119(b)(2) states, “A 
parent-child relationship exists between an individual who is adopted by the 
spouse of either genetic parent and the other genetic parent, but only for the 
purpose of the right of the adoptee or a descendant of the adoptee to inherit 
from or through the other genetic parent.”111 
The UPC, however, did not originally take this stance.112  In a 1968 
UPC Special Committee questionnaire, Advisory Committee Members were 
asked various questions regarding the adequacy of proposed Section 2-109 
(now Section 2-119).113  One question, regarding a possible clarification of 
multiple adoptions, specifically cited a preliminary draft which stated, “[A]n 
adopted child shall be treated as the natural child of his adopted parents and 
shall cease to be treated as the child of his natural parents . . . .”114  At that 
 
 104. 1980 Legislation Affecting Trusts and Estates, supra note 101 at 74; see also 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119 (2010). 
 105. 1981 Legislation Affecting Trusts and Estates, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
75, 95–96 (1981). 
 106. Id. at 95. 
 107. MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060(1) (1981). 
 108. Id. 
 109. 1981 Legislation Affecting Trusts and Estates, supra note 105. 
 110. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119 (revised 2010). 
 111. Id. § 2-119(b)(2). 
 112. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109(1) (1969) (revised 2010). 
 113. ABA, Section of Real Prop., Probate and Trust Law Comm. on of Model 
Probate Code: Questionnaire for Members of Advisory Committee, C: 12/313 Box 
10, FF6. 
 114. Cathy J. Jones, Stepparent Adoption and Inheritance: A Suggested Revision 
of the Uniform Probate Code Section 2-109, 8:53 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 53, 59 n.19 
(1986). 
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time, however, no committee member addressed any concern regarding intes-
tacy rights of adopted children from their biological parents.115  Although it is 
unclear at what point the committee discussed this issue, the provision found 
in today’s Section 2-119 was included by 1975.116 
Some states are even more liberal than the UPC.117  Pennsylvania, for 
example, allows adopted children to inherit from their biological parents as 
long as the biological parent “has maintained a family relationship with the 
adopted person.”118  Other states, similar to the UPC, provide by statute that 
an “adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect on the 
relationship between the child and either natural parent.”119  It is clear that 
there are varying approaches on intestate succession between adopted chil-
dren and their biological parents, and it is difficult to state which approach 
would best achieve the desire of a legislature to accomplish both the intent of 
the decedent as well as promote state interests. 
Each of the above issues is complicated, but taking adult adoption into 
account compounds these problems.  In Missouri, adult adoption is not differ-
entiated from minor adoption.120  Two-thirds of states allow adult adoption 
without restriction, while one-third of states require the adoptee be younger 
than the adopter.121  Although Missouri statutes do not distinguish between 
the adoption of an adult and the adoption of a minor, differentiation of out-
comes could make the legislature’s goal of honoring the decedent’s intent 
through intestacy statutes even harder to achieve.122 
The legislative history of Missouri probate law has undertaken a fasci-
nating metamorphosis, resulting in a hardline approach to intestacy law.  This 
stance, although decisive as compared to the varying approaches, left the 
court in Brockmire with no possible alternative holding. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri unanimously held that Ronald was the 
sole legal heir of Decedent.123  The court first looked to Section 474.060 in 
 
 115. ABA, supra note 113. 
 116. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119 (2010). 
 117. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2108 (1976). 
 118. Id. 
 119. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 2-109 (1997). 
 120. In re Brockmire, No. ED 99103, 2013 WL 2484534, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2013). 
 121. Joanna L. Grossman, The Potential Consequences of Adult Adoption for 
Inheritance: A Recent Virginia Supreme Court Ruling, JUSTIA (Oct. 20, 2011), 
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/10/20/the-potential-consequences-of-adult-adoption-
for-inheritance.  Other restrictions include adults to be adopted if they are between the 
ages of eighteen to twenty-one; disabled; or if there had been a “sustained parental 
relationship” for a specified time period.  Id. 
 122. Brockmire, 2013 WL 2484534 at *4. 
 123. In re Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d 445, 445–47 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
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reaching this conclusion.124  The statute states, in part, that “an adopted per-
son is the child of an adopting parent and not of the natural parents,” which 
would eliminate any possible argument that Sherri could bring under Mis-
souri adoption statutes.125 
Like the court of appeals, this court rejected Sherri’s argument that Sec-
tion 474.010 contained a conflict by using the terms “issue” and “children, or 
their descendants” because it was irrelevant to the current circumstances.126  
Even if there was a conflict, the court stated that it would have been immate-
rial because Bella is not Decedent’s surviving issue or a descendent of his 
child.127 
In making this determination, the court first looked to Section 474.010, 
which governs Missouri intestate succession.128  Here, the court construed the 
statute to determine that the statement “children, or their descendants, in 
equal parts” illustrated that grandchildren of a decedent have no inheritance 
rights, with one exception:129 grandchildren may inherit when “the grandchild 
is a descendant of a ‘child’ of the decedent;” additionally, the decedent’s 
child must have qualified to inherit “but for predeceasing the decedent.”130  
Because of Sherri’s adoption, Bella did not fit this description.131 
The court further explained Sherri’s claim that the language used in Sec-
tion 474.010 is in conflict with itself was invalid.132  The term “issue” is uti-
lized in Section 474.010(1) when delineating who may receive the remainder 
of the estate – the portion of the estate not set-aside for a surviving spouse.133  
Section 474.010(2) invokes the phrase “children, or their descendants” when 
describing distribution of an intestate estate where the decedent had no sur-
 
 124. Id. at 446. 
 125. Id. at 448; MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060(1) (2000).  Section 453.090, a Mis-
souri adoption statute, states in part: 
 
Such child shall be capable of inheriting from, and as the child of, his par-
ent or parents by adoption as fully as though born to him or them in lawful 
wedlock and, if a minor, shall be entitled to proper support, nurture and care 
from his parent or parents by adoption. 
 
MO. REV. STAT. § 453.090(2) (2000).  The court addressed that the statute does not 
eliminate the argument that an adopted person can still inherit from or through their 
natural parents.  Brockmire, 424 S.W3d. at 447–48. 
 126. Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d at 448. 
 127. Id. at 448–49.  Additionally, the court noted that the word adopted issue 
within the definition of issue references a relationship between an adopted child and 
an adoptive parent.  Id. at 449. 
 128. Id. at 446. 
 129. Id. at 447. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 448. 
 133. MO. REV. STAT. § 474.010 (2000). 
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viving spouse.134  Here, the court rejected Sherri’s argument that Bella would 
have qualified as a surviving issue and reasoned that it was useless to Sherri’s 
position to include Bella within “children, or their descendants,” as Bella met 
either description.135 
The court added that Sherri’s argument was flawed because the phrases 
“issue” and “children, or their descendants” are used for different purposes 
and, even more distinctly, because Bella would not qualify as a surviving 
issue of Decedent.136  The court explained that Sherri’s declaration that Bella 
should qualify as an “issue” was derived from a flawed reading of the defini-
tion.137  “Issue” under Missouri law excludes “those who are the lineal de-
scendants of living lineal descendants of the [decedent].”138  Here, the court 
again enunciated that regardless of the adoption, Bella would not qualify for 
inheritance from Decedent unless Sherri had predeceased Decedent.139  Addi-
tionally, the court pointed out that the definition of issue includes “adopted 
children,” referencing a decedent’s children by adoption, meaning that Bella 
is an issue of Sherri’s adoptive parents, but not of Decedent’s.140 
Additionally, the court proclaimed that grandchildren do not have inher-
itance rights under Section 474.010 and rejected Sherri’s request to treat her 
as though she predeceased Decedent, stating that “the statutes governing 
adoption and intestate succession [do] not support such conclusions, but they 
also plainly preclude them.”141 
After addressing the statutory construction of Sections 474.010 and 
474.060, the court took note of Sherri’s contention that she should be “treated 
as a ‘child’ of Decedent, despite her adoption and that she should have been 
deemed to have “died as a result of the adoption.”  The court reasoned that 
these arguments were invalid because applicable intestate succession statutes, 
as well as relevant adoption statutes, did not lead to that conclusion.142  The 
court cited Missouri Revised Statute Section 453.090 in support of its hold-
ing, the pertinent part stating, “When a child . . . is adopted . . . all legal rela-
tionships and all rights . . . between such child and his natural parents . . . 
shall cease and determine.”143  Here, the court acknowledged that while this 
provision allowed Sherri to argue that she was still Decedent’s descendant, 
Section 474.060 eliminated that argument, as it states, “[F]or purposes of 
intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must be established to 
determine succession by, through, or from a person, an adopted person is the 
 
 134. Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d at 448. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 448–49. 
 137. Id. 
 138. § 472.010. 
 139. Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d at 446. 
 140. Id. at 449.  The Court points to other Missouri statutes that stipulate adopted 
children are children of the adoptive parents and not of the biological parents.  Id. 
 141. Id. at 447. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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child of an adopting parent and not of the natural parents.”144  The court fur-
ther explained this position, stating: “[E]ven if the Court assumes that Sherri 
should be treated as having ‘died’ as a result of her adoption,” Sherri would 
still not qualify as Decedent’s child, meaning Bella could not qualify as a 
descendant of Decedent.145 
Next, the court rejected Sherri’s determination that Bella “had a vested 
right to her legal bloodline,” which was taken away from her without notice 
by Sherri’s adoption.146  Here, the court quoted the longstanding principle 
that “no one is an heir to the living and that the living have no heirs in a legal 
sense.”147  The court stated that Bella had no rights, so she could not lose any 
rights regardless of the fact that Sherri’s adoption affected how intestate suc-
cession applied to Bella under Missouri law.148 
Here, the court determined that when Sherri was adopted by her stepfa-
ther, all legal ties between her and her biological father were severed under 
Section 474.060 and that when the legal ties between a parent and child are 
severed, the legal ties between the grandparent and grandchild are likewise 
severed.149  The court looked beyond issues of adoption and stated that where 
the child of a decedent is still living, a grandchild of the decedent will be 
precluded from inheriting, rendering Bella unable to inherit from Decedent.150  
Lastly, the court addressed Sherri’s due process argument and stated that 
where an heir is expectant or apparent, they have no interest in a future dece-
dent’s property, holding that Bella had no “legal bloodline” rights to lose.151 
V.  COMMENT 
The competing goals of intestacy law are difficult to reconcile with the 
increasing complexity of the family dynamic in our society.  As the court in 
Brockmire stated, “[T]he General Assembly may enact whatever intestate 
succession statutes it sees fit – or none at all – this court is not authorized to 
second-guess the policy decision reflected in [the statutes].”152  Because in-
testate succession is governed by statute, the courts are bound to follow black 
letter law without taking into account the extrinsic circumstances and evi-
dence that may indicate that the decedent’s actual intent would depart from 
what the law provides.153  To remedy the problematic outcomes of the current 
intestacy scheme, the Missouri legislature should amend Section 474.060 to 
 
 144. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 474.060(1) (2000). 
 145. Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d at 448. 
 146. Id. at 449. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 447–48. 
 150. Id. at 447. 
 151. Id. at 449. 
 152. Id. at 450. 
 153. Id. 
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permit a child adopted by a stepparent to inherit through both biological par-
ents. 
Traditional adoption, adult adoption, and stepparent adoption all in-
crease the legislature’s difficult task of constructing statutes that honor a de-
cedent’s presumed intent.  But all of these complications can also arise when 
construing a testator’s will.154  Rules of construction allow for extrinsic evi-
dence of the testator’s intent to be taken into account when construing certain 
ambiguities within a will.155  One Missouri court went so far as to say, “[A] 
court will enforce the intent of the testator, no matter what is expressed in the 
will.”156 
Intestacy statues have been called “the will which the law makes.”157  
With the ever-changing family dynamic, it is hard to imagine how intestacy 
statutes will be able to keep up, or rather, stay ahead of the evolution of the 
family – but does this mean that it is time for these statutes to include the 
subjective, to permit evidence of intent?  The law of wills in Missouri, for 
example, allows extrinsic evidence to be introduced when a latent ambiguity 
exists within a will.158  Attempting to determine the intent of all Missourians 
who have died intestate would surely be a drain upon the resources of the 
Missouri judiciary and the families of decedents.  In Brockmire, for example, 
the entire estate in dispute was valued at a mere $25,000.159  After court costs 
and attorney’s fees, it is hard to imagine that Ronald recovered any substan-
tial amount of Decedent’s estate.  If intent was permitted to be an issue every 
time a decedent died intestate, many more lawful descendants would be at 
risk of a lawsuit.  Further, if the Missouri probate courts were mandated to 
determine the intent of an intestate decedent each time a suit was brought by 
an aggrieved relative, it could cause a flurry of lengthy “he said, she said” 
cases.  Although a determination of each intestate decedent’s intent may be 
impossible to discern, Missouri statutes must endeavor to keep up with the 
average decedent’s intent. 
Brockmire presents a litany of complications.160  First, Sherri was an 
adult at the time of her adoption.  Secondly, her stepfather adopted her.  Last-
ly, Sherri herself is not attempting to collect from her biological father’s es-
 
 154. See Switzer v. Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, 932 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1996) (intent of including adopted children); Davis v. Neilson, 871 S.W.2d 35, 
38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (intent of including adopted adult). 
 155. MCGOVERN, KURTZ & ENGLISH, supra note 88, at 313. 
 156. In re Just’s Estate, 618 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
 157. Hirsch, supra note 1, at 1032–33 (quoting PETER LOVELASS, THE WILL 
WHICH MAKES THE LAW, (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1785) (in subsequent 
editions, retitled: THE LAW’S DISPOSAL OF A PERSON’S ESTATE WHO DIES WITHOUT 
WILL OR TESTAMENT)). 
 158. Breckner v. Prestwood, 600 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (extrinsic 
evidence permitted for latent and patent ambiguities). 
 159. In re Brockmire, No. ED 99103, 2013 WL 2484534, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 
June 11, 2013). 
 160. In re Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d 445, 446 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
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tate, but rather Sherri is asking the court to permit her daughter, Bella, to in-
herit from Decedent’s intestate estate.161  The Brockmire court, by applying 
Missouri intestacy statutes, reached the conclusion that Sherri’s legal rela-
tionship with Decedent severed upon her adoption, which consequently sev-
ered her child’s legal relationship with Decedent as well.162  There is no 
doubt that the court’s application of these statutes reached the legally required 
conclusion, but it is impossible to know if the court’s conclusion achieved 
Decedent’s actual intent.  Additionally, one might inquire whether these stat-
utes have become antiquated and thus no longer represent the average dece-
dent’s probable intent. 
It is hard to ignore the fact that the Missouri legislature has not made 
any effort to address the special circumstances of stepparent adoption, espe-
cially when the UPC addressed these concerns nearly forty years ago.163  Ad-
ditionally, multiple states have adjusted their intestacy statutes to account for 
this increasingly common occurrence.164  It is even more perplexing that Mis-
souri reverted to a more restricting version of Section 474.060, even after the 
UPC made revisions to become more accommodating to adopted stepchil-
dren.165  Today, it is difficult to imagine that the intent of the average biologi-
cal grandparent would be to automatically disinherit their biological grand-
child if that grandchild or their parent happens to have been adopted – partic-
ularly when the adoptive parent is the surviving spouse of the biological par-
ent. 
It is impossible to construct intestacy provisions that will cover every 
decedent’s final wishes, but it is important for the legislature to keep up with 
the general intent of the public.  Legislatures must also decide to what extent 
the average decedent would want an adopted child to inherit.  Would they 
adopt the standard provided by the Pennsylvania statute, which takes into 
consideration maintained relationships,166 or perhaps a bright-line rule similar 
to what the UPC provides,167 or even a statute that provides inheritance rights 
to those who are adopted following the death of the biological par-
ent/decedent?168 
Although there are many options, the legislature’s dual goals of effi-
ciency and serving a decedent’s intent are best met by enacting a statute simi-
lar to, or even identical to, the provision provided under the UPC.  By creat-
ing a statute that does not take any subjective factors into account, it would 
seem unlikely that there would be an increase in litigation.  A more subjective 
statute, like the Pennsylvania statute, would be less likely to meet that goal; 
 
 161. Id. at 446. 
 162. Id. at 447–48. 
 163. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109 (1969). 
 164. Brockmire¸ 2013 WL 2484534, at *5. 
 165. 1980 Mo. Laws 480; see also, Jones, supra note 114, at 63. 
 166. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2514 (2014). 
 167. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119 (2010). 
 168. MINN. STAT. § 259.59 (2008). 
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although in fairness to the Pennsylvania statute, it does not appear that sub-
stantial litigation has ensued.169 
Beyond conservation of judicial resources, a statute similar to the UPC 
would be more likely to meet a decedent’s probable intent.  An approach 
identical to the UPC approach could, like the current Missouri statute, also 
provide the unsatisfactory result that a decedent’s actual intent would not be 
honored.  But, an approach identical to the UPC would not punish a child 
adopted by a stepparent, or as in Brockmire, the descendant of an adopted 
stepchild.170 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In re Brockmire presents the kind of familial complexities that have be-
come commonplace in today’s society.  Those complexities should be ad-
dressed by the Missouri legislature. 
Similar to the evolution of adoption in Missouri, intestacy statutes 
should continue to evolve to conform to the probable intent of an average 
decedent.  The best way to achieve the average decedent’s intent is for Mis-
souri to enact a statute similar or identical to UPC Section 2-119.  Because 
intestate succession is governed completely by statute in Missouri, the courts 
will continue to be restrained by applying black letter law and will be unable 
to provide for any inheritance tie with the biological family until the statutes 
are modified to accommodate the changing family dynamic. 
 
 169. PA. CONS. STAT. § 2514. 
 170. In re Brockmire, 424 S.W.3d 445 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
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